4 · Route
Policy router
Waiting for masked request…
Local model on-prem vLLM NOT USED
Cloud AI Claude, masked ● SELECTED
Policy: Secrets and IPs masked → safe to send to Claude (cloud)
Zero-Leak Gateway
BrightPath IT (MSP) · Demo DEMO DATA
Request pipeline
Every AI request passes through these 8 stepsPress Send to AI through Zero-Leak to start. Click any step to jump to it.
JR
Technician: Jordan R. · Claude Code
What the tech pasted
3 secrets
3 IPs
1 hostname
1 client
What the AI actually sees
● Masked before leaving
Masked copy appears at step 3.
Nothing has left the network yet.
Nothing has left the network yet.
Secrets SHREDDED before sending, restored only on the employee's screen
IPs / hosts DISGUISED consistent tokens, restored for the tech
Client names HIDDEN restored for the tech
5 · Answer
AI answer, as the model wrote it
Waiting for model…
Policy 12 denies SMB from NET_3 to HOST_2 (IP_7). Add an allow rule for SMB from NET_3 to HOST_2 and move it above policy 12.
6 · Restore
Tokens swapped back, inside the network
Waiting for answer…
- IP_7 →
- 10.20.5.14
- HOST_2 →
- acme-fs01.acmelaw.local
- CLIENT_A →
- Acme Law
- <SECRET> →
- Original secret (restored locally only)
- NET_3 →
- 172.16.50.0/24
- PUBLIC_IP_1 →
- 203.0.113.45
7 · Deliver
The end result
Waiting for answer…
Same answer. The AI never saw a single real value. Jordan sees all of them.Real values are restored on Jordan's machine and gateway; they never leave the network.
Restored locally · never sent to AIWhy can't VPN users reach the file server at Acme Law?
Claude · just now Protected · 3 secrets masked Admin password, VPN pre-shared key and SNMP community shredded before sending and restored only on this screen. 3 IPs, 1 hostname and 1 client name tokenized and restored. Logged for audit.
Policy 12 denies SMB from VPN_POOL (172.16.50.0/24) to acme-fs01.acmelaw.local (10.20.5.14) for Acme Law. Add an allow rule above it:
config firewall policy
edit 11
set name "Allow-VPN-to-FS01"
set srcaddr "VPN_POOL"
set dstaddr "acme-fs01.acmelaw.local"
set service "SMB"
set action accept
next
end
config vpn ipsec phase1-interface
edit "ACME-VPN"
set remote-gw 203.0.113.45
set psksecret Sup3rS3cretPSK!
next
end
Suggested change. Zero-Leak never touches devices.
Policy 12 denies SMB from VPN_POOL (NET_3) to HOST_2 (IP_7) for CLIENT_A. Add an allow rule above it:
config firewall policy
edit 11
set name "Allow-VPN-to-FS01"
set srcaddr "VPN_POOL"
set dstaddr "HOST_2"
set service "SMB"
set action accept
next
end
config vpn ipsec phase1-interface
edit "ACME-VPN"
set remote-gw PUBLIC_IP_1
set psksecret <SECRET>
next
end
8 · Log
Audit entry
● Allowed (masked)
Waiting…
- Time
- 11:07 AM
- User
- Jordan R.
- Client
- CLIENT_A (Acme Law)
- Model
- Claude (cloud, masked)
- Detected
- 3 secrets / 3 IPs / 1 host / 1 client
- Real values sent to AI
- 0
Scenario 2: what if a tech skips the gateway and goes straight to a public AI site?
claude.ai/new
Acme Law firewall won't let VPN in. Admin login is admin / Acm3!Fw2026, can you tell me what's wrong?
Claude 1 password masked The browser extension swapped the admin password for <SECRET> before sending, and put it back on this screen only. Logged for the security team.
Log in as admin / Acm3!Fw2026 and check the policy order. Common causes: the VPN address pool isn't allowed by a firewall policy, or a deny rule sits above the allow rule for traffic from the VPN interface to the internal network.
What Claude saw
Acme Law firewall won't let VPN in. Admin login is admin / <SECRET>, can you tell me what's wrong?
Log in as admin / <SECRET> and check the policy order…
No pop-ups, no approvals. Security teams see it in the dashboard instead.
In 30 days, 1,137 secrets that would have gone to public AI were stopped. Zero leaked.Zero pop-ups or approval requests for employees.30-day pilot · Pilot projection · fictional figures
AI requests protected4,812
Secrets caught before leaving1,137
Secrets leaked0
Employee interruptions0
Requests blocked23
Real values sent to AI0
Secrets caught by type
Passwords lead; 1,137 in totalWhere AI requests ran
Share of protected requestsTop clients by protected requests
Masked view. Real names are shown only to admins.| Client | Share | Protected requests |
|---|
Audit log export readySOC 2 evidenceHIPAA/GLBA client policies applied
Invisible by design: employees just use AI; the gateway handles safety in the background. Only admins see alerts.
1
One URL
Point AI tools at the gateway.
- Claude API
- Claude Code via
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL - Copilot bring-your-own-model
2
Browser extension
Masks on paste and send.
- claude.ai
- chatgpt.com
- Copilot web
3
Company chat
Your own chat app for techs.
- Block public AI at the firewall
4
Tool wrapping
For agents and automations.
- MCP tool results masked before the AI reads them
Built from open source
Proven, auditable parts
Microsoft PresidioMIT
gitleaksMIT
Yelp detect-secretsApache-2.0
vLLMApache-2.0
FlowerApache-2.0 · later phase
4-week POC plan
- Week 1Gateway, secret scanning, masking
- Week 2Config parsers (Fortinet, Cisco, pfSense, Palo Alto), subnet-aware masking
- Week 3Local model, routing, silent masking in browsers, audit log
- Week 4Leak test on 200 configs, dashboard, pilot with 3 techs
Pricing
$30 to $60per tech per month
Concept demo. All data fictional.